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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SD-14461-2

CSGID 904.3(PC)

25 February 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Comments on Report: "The Central Intelligence Agency
and National Organization for Intelligence."

1. Reference is made to:

a. Report: "The Central Intelligence Agency and National
Organization for Intelligence," (Dulles Report), dated 1 January 1949.

b. Memorandum for the National Security Council by the
Executive Secretary, subject: "The Central Intelligence Agency and
National Organization for Intelligence," dated 24 January 1949.

c. Memorandum for the members of IAC by Director of Central
Intelligence, subject: "Dulles, Correa, Jackson Report," dated
24 January 1949,

2. In accordance with request of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, contained in paragraph 3 of reference c above, the following
comments are made on recommendations and conclusions which are con-
tained in subject report:

a. Chapter II (National Intelligence and the National
Security Act of 1947) page 27.

Army review(s)
completed.

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(1). Concur in the statement that no amendments to intelligence portions of the National Security Act of 1947 are deemed necessary at this time.

(2). Concur in the statement that CIA is properly placed in governmental structure.

(3). It is not considered appropriate to comment on the necessity for establishment of closer liaison between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretaries of State and Defense.

b. Chapter III (The Organization and Administration of The Central Intelligence Agency), pages 38 & 39.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on internal organization and administration of the CIA.

c. Chapter IV (The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for the Coordination of Intelligence Activities), page 63.

(1). The Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, does not concur in the statement that the responsibility of CIA with respect to coordination of intelligence activities has not been fully discharged. It is considered that the argument advanced in this report that CIA has a mandate to control activities of various departmental agencies is not sound and is based on an interpretation of the law not shared by the National Security Council as is evidenced by its publication

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of the various NSC Intelligence Directives. Efforts at control by the Director, Central Intelligence by resort to individual recommendations to NSC would be faced by the possibility of obstruction by the Secretary of Defense and/or by individual members of the NSC proper. It is a basic assumption that the Director of Central Intelligence, who is not a part of the National Military Establishment, has not a mandate to supervise, direct, or control the Service intelligence agencies which are intelligence staffs responsible to their respective Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries. The Director of Intelligence is of the opinion that such deficiencies as exist in the coordination of intelligence activities can and should be corrected by appropriate action of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

(2). Concur in the statement that more active efforts and coordination are needed in the field of scientific intelligence.

(3). It is considered that the Department of Justice should be consulted as to the advisability of FBI being included in membership of the IAC. The Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, has no objection to its being included, if it is mutually desirable with Director of Central Intelligence and FBI.

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(4). Non-concur in the statement that Director of Central Intelligence should be permanent chairman of USCIB. It is further felt that this question is not in the purview of the IAC.

(5). Concur in the statement that more active participation in coordination of intelligence activities by IAC is desirable.

(6). Non-concur in limiting membership on IAC to Director of Central Intelligence and representatives of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and FBI. Continued membership of AEC and JIG is desirable.

(7). It is not considered appropriate for the Director of Intelligence to comment on the organization and functions of Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff. This is considered a matter of primary concern to Director of Central Intelligence.

(8). Comments in paragraph 7 above also apply to question of reassignment of responsibilities now performed by office of Collection and Dissemination. This is an internal CIA problem.

d. Chapter V (The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for National Intelligence Estimates), page 81.

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(1). Concur in the statement that there has been confusion in CIA with regard to national intelligence estimates and miscellaneous research and reporting activities. There have been incidents where CIA has prepared estimates covering the fields of primary concern to other agencies without consultation. This indicated either lack of coordination or the placing of too much dependence on Service personnel within the CIA organization.

(2). Concur in the statement that the provisions of National Security Act for the production of national estimates are sound, but have not been effectively carried out.

(3). It is not considered appropriate to comment on the creation of a small estimates division within the CIA, this being an internal organization problem.

(4). Concur in the statement that national estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the IAC.

(5). Concur in the statement that provision should be made for handling of "crisis situation" estimates, but consider that IAC can and will perform this function.

(6). Concur in the statement that such coordinated national intelligence estimates must be recognized as the most authoritative.

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- e. Chapter VI (Services of Common Concern: Intelligence Research and Reports) page 91.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on organization within CIA to accomplish CIA research function.

- f. Chapter VII (Services of Common Concern: The Collection of Overt Intelligence) page 104.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on the organization within CIA to perform the function of collection of overt intelligence.

- g. Chapter VIII (Services of Common Concern: The Collection of Secret Intelligence) page 129.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on the organization within CIA to perform the function of collection of secret intelligence.

- h. Chapter IX (Services of Common Concern: The Conduct of Secret Operations) page 134.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on the organization within CIA to perform the conduct of secret operations.

- i. Chapter X (The Direction of the Central Intelligence Agency) page 138.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on the direction of Central Intelligence Agency.

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j. Chapter XI (The Service Intelligence Agencies) page 149.

(1). Concur in the statement that Service intelligence agencies have manifested increased interest and more cooperative attitude in intelligence matters.

(2). Non-concur in the statement that Service intelligence agencies should be staffed with permanent intelligence specialists. Intelligence Division does subscribe to the theory that there should be semi-permanent specialization in intelligence by a small percentage of senior officers.

(3). Concur in the statement that more active program by CIA in fields of common interest would result in higher degree of centralization and coordination.

(4). Concur in the statement that Service intelligence agencies should confine themselves to their respective fields of primary intelligence interest.

(5). Concur in the statement that there should be effective coordination between JIC, CIA and IAC in preparation of national intelligence estimates.

k. Chapter XII (The Intelligence Functions of the Department of State) page 161.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on intelligence organization and functions of the State Department.

(Signed) S. LeRoy Irwin

S. LeROY IRWIN

Major General, GSC

Director of Intelligence

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